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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the empirical and theoretical association between the duration of a pegged
exchange rate and the cost experienced upon exiting the regime.  We confirm empirically that
exits from pegged exchange rate regimes during the past two decades have often been
accompanied by crises, the cost of which increases with the duration of the peg before the crisis. 
We explain these observations in which the exchange rate peg is used as a commitment
mechanism to achieve inflation stability when multiple equilibria are possible. We show that
there are ex ante large gains from choosing a more conservative regime not only in order to
mitigate inflation bias from time inconsistency, but also to avoid the high inflation equilibria. In
these circumstances, using a pegged exchange rate as an anti-inflation commitment device can
create a “trap” whereby the regime initially confers gains in anti-inflation credibility, but
ultimately results in an exit occasioned by a big enough adverse real shock that creates large
welfare losses to the economy.  
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Exits from pegged exchange rate regimes have often been accompanied by crises and severe 
declines in economic activity.  Major currency crises over the past decade have had particularly adverse 
effects on output growth; for example, output declined by 6% in Mexico in 1995, 7% in Thailand and 
Korea in 1998, and by more than 11% in Argentina in 2002.  Looking at a wide sample of countries, 
Eichengreen and Masson (1998) and Eichengreen (1999) find that exits from pegged exchange rate 
regimes typically have been accompanied by output declines, with economic growth slowing in the 
periods leading up the exit, falling further in the year at the time the exit occurs, and recovering 
thereafter.  Eichengreen (1999), documenting the absence of an exit strategy from fixed exchange rates 
for many countries, concludes: “…exits from pegged exchange rates have not occurred under favorable 
circumstances.  They have not had happy results.”   
This paper provides an explanation for why pegged exchange rate regimes have tended to end 
so explosively.  It argues that using pegged exchange rate as a commitment device for achieving 
inflation stability can create a “trap” whereby the regime initially confers gains in anti-inflation 
credibility, but ultimately results in an exit occasioned by large adverse real shocks, resulting in big 
welfare losses to the economy.  We thus suggest that fixed exchange rate regimes can plant the seeds of 
their own demise. 
We do so in a framework extending Obstfeld (1996)’s setting, where the monetary authority 
determines the exchange rate (and hence the inflation rate) based on its degree of aversion to inflation 
relative to output fluctuations, the magnitude of shocks, and the (fixed) cost of allowing discrete 
exchange rate changes. In accordance with Rogoff (1985)’s insight, we find that among the pool of 
possible candidates/regimes, each differing in its degree of anti-inflation firmness, the optimal 
monetary authority candidate is characterized by a “conservative bias”, i.e. a relative weight on 
inflation stabilization greater than that of society as a whole, in order to mitigate the inflation bias 
arising from time inconsistency. However, we also show that multiple equilibria are possible. In this 
case there are ex ante gains from choosing a more conservative monetary authority not only in order to 
lower private sector inflation expectations and mitigate the inflation bias, but also to avoid high 
inflation equilibria.  These gains, however, come at a cost in the form of the monetary authority’s lesser 
responsiveness to output shocks to the economy.  Hence in choosing the monetary authority there is a 
tradeoff between, on the one hand, the gains from greater firmness in stabilizing inflation and, on the 
other hand, the ex post costs associated with a lesser willingness to respond to output shocks.    
This tradeoff may plant the seeds of the regime’s ultimate demise:  bad enough shocks 




negative output shocks not resulting in devaluation will induce welfare losses to the public. In these 
circumstances, the gap in welfare evaluation between the public and monetary authority is of a first-
order magnitude, proportional to the difference between the public’s and the monetary authority’s 
degree of firmness. Ultimately, for a bad enough shock, the cost of sustaining the existing regime will 
rise above the cost of regime change, inducing a large devaluation accompanied by sizable disruption 
of the economy. This suggests that more conservative and longer-lasting pegged regimes are likely to 
end with severe output losses.  That is, the longer the duration of a peg before its collapse, the greater 
is the adverse effect on the economy when it does collapse.
1  However, despite the eventual collapse of 
the regime, a pegged exchange rate regime with a more conservative anti-inflation firmness can still be 
desirable ex ante because of the disinflationary credibility gain at the beginning of the regime.   
These results may explain the severity of the demise of an Argentinean type of currency board: 
legally anchoring the currency board in the constitution increased the cost of devaluation and regime 
change, but also planted the seeds of a trap associated with the fixed exchange rate regime.  While in 
the short run it led to obvious credibility gains, it also increased the duration of the peg as well as the 
output costs associated with the devaluation that occurred when Argentina ultimately exited from the 
regime.   
Of course, it is important to consider why many countries have adopted exchange rate pegs in the 
first place.  In recent years, there has been greater awareness that high and variable inflation distorts the 
private sector’s decision-making with regards to investment, savings, and production, and ultimately leads 
to slower economic growth. Consequently, various institutional reforms have been suggested to lower 
inflation expectations through the adoption of credible monetary policy institutions.  These include 
creating an independent central banker that places a higher weight on inflation stabilization than the 
private sector (Rogoff, 1985), designing incentive contracts that penalize central bank governors either by 
loss of compensation or prestige (Walsh, 1995), or adopting some credible rule of monetary policy 
commitment.  
In an open economy, the same array of institutional reforms is available. However, pegging the 
exchange rate to a stable foreign currency provides another instrument for providing a credible 
commitment to low inflation. Indeed, as Frankel (1999) has observed, choosing the exchange rate as the 
nominal anchor and importing credibility from abroad has the advantage of being relatively easy to 
implement and providing an easily observable commitment to monetary policy.
2Moreover, emerging 
                                                 
1 Klein and Marion (1997) analyze the duration of exchange rate regimes in Latin America.  Husain, Mody and 
Rogoff (2005) study exchange rate regime durability and performance in developing versus advanced economies. 
2 Atkeson and Kehoe (2001) show formally that the greater transparency of an exchange rate peg relative to a 
monetary aggregate target helps reduce credibility problems that arise when the government cannot commit to 




economies traditionally lack the institutions and knowledge to establish an independent monetary 
framework that credibly delivers price stability. For these reasons, a currency peg of some sort has been 
perceived by many countries as an attractive approach to expressing monetary policy commitment.
3  In 
these circumstances, a country may end up with a second-best choice, delegating the conduct of exchange 
rate policy to a conservative monetary authority and trading off the immediate disinflationary credibility 
gain with the downside risk that a large negative shock may trigger a future crisis.    
Calvo and Vegh’s analysis (1999) of stabilization programs shows that many developing 
countries adopted exchange rate pegs to provide a nominal anchor to reduce inflation, which in many 
instances were successful in stabilizing inflation from historically high levels. Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1988) argued that membership in the European Monetary System generally brought significant 
credibility gains to policymakers in inflation-prone countries, explaining why countries such as Spain, 
Italy, and Portugal were eager to import Germany's monetary discipline. Ravenna (2005) argues that 
joining the European Monetary Union currently affords new and potential accession members from 
Eastern Europe the same benefits.   
  Nevertheless, depending on its degree of firmness, pegging the exchange rate does not exempt a 
country from concerns about the credibility of the peg, since the public knows that the government has an 
incentive to renege  and devalue the currency to depreciate the real exchange rate in response to a large 
enough economic disturbance.  There is a vast literature on why pegged regimes may be crisis prone, 
dealing with issues that are well beyond the scope of the present paper.  Some focus on how limiting 
exchange rate flexibility may increase risk taking by borrowers and lenders.  Others focus on how 
liberalization and increased capital mobility have increased exposure to shocks, particularly those creating 
inconsistencies between a currency peg and other macroeconomic policies (see Agenor and Montiel 
(1999) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) for further details). Our study is more closely related to papers 
that have studied the impact of policy maker preferences on the conduct of discretionary policy (see 
Cukierman and Liviatan (1991), Lohman (1992), and the references therein). 
Section 2 presents some stylized facts about the severity of output declines during recent exits 
from pegged regimes. In Section 3 we formulate a model that explains the stylized fact that exits from 
long-lasting pegs appear to be accompanied by particularly large falls in economic activity.   
                                                                                                                                                             
to a fixed exchange rate can outweigh the loss from maintaining an independent monetary policy if the domestic 
monetary authority does not enjoy full credibility. A threshold level of credibility must be achieved for a central 
bank to adopt inflation targeting over an exchange rate targeting regime.  
3Implementation of an inflation targeting framework requires reasonably well-understood channels between policy 
instruments and inflation, the relative effectiveness of different monetary instruments, and the lags involved; a 
methodology to produce inflation forecasts; and a forward-looking operating procedure for the central bank that 
captures how much the operating instrument (usually some domestic interest rate) should be adjusted in response to 
deviations of the inflation forecast (the intermediate target) from the inflation target. These requirements are 





2. Simple Stylized Facts about Exits 
To examine the decline in economic activity associated with exits to more flexible exchange rate 
regimes we make use of the data set assembled by Detragiache, Mody, and Okada (2005). They identify 
63 episodes over the period 1980-2001 in which countries with heavily managed exchange rates ended in 
an exit, defined as a move to a more flexible exchange rate regime.
4 Of these 63 episodes, 32 are deemed 
“disorderly” in the sense that currency fell freely at some time during the 12 month period after the exit; 
the remaining episodes are deemed “orderly.”  
The top panel of Figure 1 presents event windows for the full sample of episodes showing the 
average behavior of real GDP growth for the years before, during, and after exits from pegged regimes, 
with the observations surrounded by two standard deviation bands.
5  The figure shows that economic 
growth typically slows in the periods leading up the exit, is almost zero on average in the year after the 
exit occurs, following which growth recovers.  For the subsample of disorderly exits in the bottom panel, 
the depth of the downturn is more severe and growth is actually negative in the year after exits.  Figure 2 
presents event windows for the more recent period of 1990-2001.  Comparison with Figure 1 indicates 
that the severity of output declines is higher in the more recent period, supporting the view that greater 
capital mobility has increased the magnitude of welfare losses associated with financial crises.  
Figure 3 presents scatter plots for GDP growth in either the year of an exit or the year after 
(whichever is lower) against the duration (in months) of the regime in place prior to the exit. For the full 
sample, a slight negative slope is apparent: the longer the duration of a pegged exchange rate regime, the 
lower (greater) is output growth (decline). When focus is drawn to the disorderly cases (bottom panel), 
the negative slope is more pronounced and is significant.  
These results are confirmed with simple linear regressions reported in Table 1; the negative 
association of output growth following exits with the duration of pegged exchange rate spells is 
significant at 5% for the full sample and at better than 1% for the disorderly sample. The table also reports 
the results of restricting the sample to 1990 or later.  Observe that for the sample of both orderly and 
disorderly exit episodes the negative effect of duration is almost double in magnitude when the 1980s 
observations are excluded. In contrast, the results for the disorderly exit episodes alone are roughly the 
                                                 
4 More specifically, using the Reinhart-Rogoff  “natural” classification scheme, they define an exit as occurring 
when a country moves from categories 1–2, corresponding to pegs or heavily managed exchange rate regimes, to 
coarse categories 3–6, corresponding to more flexible regimes. A disorderly exit is characterized as one in which the 
transition is to the “freely falling” category, within 12 months of the original exit. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) define 
the exchange rate as freely falling if its rate of depreciation is large, there is high inflation, or a speculative attack 
against the currency takes place.  Note that the sample of  Detragiache et al (2005) includes both developing and 
industrial countries. 
5 We omit Iraq’s 1982 exit because of the extreme decline in output, almost 40 percent. Note Detragiache et al treat 




same across periods.  This implies that orderly exits from longer duration pegs have been associated with 
more severe output declines in the 1990s than in the 1980s.
6  One possible reason for this is the greater 
role of international capital flows. 
These results support the findings of Eichengreen and Masson (1998) and Eichengreen (1999) 
that exits from pegged exchange rate regimes have been accompanied by output declines.  In addition, 
they show that exits from long-lasting pegs, both orderly and disorderly, appear to be accompanied by 
particularly large falls in economic activity. We proceed to formulate a model that explains these stylized 
facts.     
    
3. Model 
Our model specification is influenced by a desire for the simplest framework within which to 
characterize the role of credibility in the design of an optimal monetary policy based on the exchange rate. 
The model is deliberately stylized in order to highlight the tension between the government and the 
private sector in policy design rather than the details of the transmission mechanism. The basic 
framework follows Flood and Marion (1999), a simplified version of Obstfeld (1996).  
Output is determined by inflation surprises and real shocks:      
 
e yu ππ =− − 
where  ,
e π π  are actual and expected inflation, respectively, and u is an adverse productivity shock, 
) , 0 ( ~
2
u f u σ .
7 We assume purchasing power parity holds, so that domestic inflation equals the rate of 
domestic currency devaluation for a small open economy (assuming foreign inflation is zero), so that with 
a pegged exchange rate  0 π = .
8 The social loss function attaches a penalty to inflation (or deflation), 
deviations of output from a target, and any realignment of the exchange rate:  
(1) 
22 () p Ly k c β πχ =+ − +  
where k (>0) is the target level of output associated with distortions in the economy
9,  p β  is the relative 
weight placed by the public on inflation/output losses,  i.e. its degree of desired firmness against inflation, 
χ is the indicator function,  
                                                 
6 Unreported regressions confirm this.  
7 The potential or natural level of output is implicitly set to zero.  
8 The assumption of purchasing power parity (and the absence of nontraded goods) creates a rigid link between the 
domestic price level and the central bank’s policy instrument -- the exchange rate. This allows us to abstract from a 
more complicated policy transmission mechanism.  
9 Various reasons have been suggested for the existence of distortions that place the central bank’s output target 
above the market-clearing natural output level: a difference in social and private returns to additional labor supply 










= ⎨ = ⎩
,  
and c is the fixed cost associated with any exchange rate realignment.  
Policy control is delegated to a monetary authority with the following loss function    
(1’) 
22 () M yk c βπχ =+ − + , 
where the authority’s inflation/output loss weight or firmness β  is initially greater than that of 
society p β , i.e.  p β β > . We assume that β  and  p β  are publically known.  We deal with the case in 
which the equilibrium is time invariant and omit time subscripts.  
 
3.1 Optimal Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy  
The monetary authority optimizes by setting the inflation rate -- and the corresponding 
devaluation or revaluation rate -- that minimizes the expectation of the loss function (1’).  As in similar 
models, the productivity shock and public’s expected inflation rate are known by the monetary authority 
before choosing the level of inflation, while productivity and the inflation rate are not ex ante known by 
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where the latter is conditional on the regime’s firmnessβ  . Thus, the authority changes the exchange 
rate only when u is high enough, i.e. uu >  (in which case the currency is devalued) or low enough, i.e. 
uu <   (in which case the currency is revalued), to make 
dev fix M M β β < .
10 For shock realizations uuu >>, 
the fixed exchange rate is maintained. 
                                                                                                                                                             
difference in firm returns to additional output because of imperfect competition; or political pressure on the central 
bank from the rest of the government to expand economic activity (e.g. Cukierman and Gerlach 2003).  
10 The assumption that the costs of realignment c are the same for devaluations or revaluations implies that 




The expected social loss function corresponding to the optimal inflation rate, given public 
inflation expectations 
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As is well known, because expected inflation 
e π enters here both in (i) determining  the inflation rate the 
authority chooses conditional on preferring to realign and in (ii) determining the probability of 
realignment (through  , uu ), the possibility of multiple equilibria arises. 
11 Rational expectation 
equilibrium implies that public sector’s expected inflation 
e π equals expected inflation  ( ) E π , where  













++ ∫∫ . 
To gain further insight, let us consider the case where u follows the double exponential 
distribution, with zero mean and variance 
2 2/θ : 
(6)   ] exp[
2
) ( u u f θ
θ
− = .   
A convenient feature of this distribution is that we can solve for the closed form of (5):
12 
                                                 
11 In the absence of realignment costs, i.e. c = 0,  the analysis reduces to the Barro-Gordon case of a unique 
equilibrium under policy discretion in which the inflation bias ,  / k π β = , is proportional to the gap between the 
central bank’s target output rate (k) and the natural rate (assumed 0), presumed to be positive. The assumption that 
the target level of output exceeds the natural potential rate has been subject to challenge. For example, McCallum 
(1995) argues that since, in equilibrium, output equals the natural rate but inflation is greater than optimal, central 
banks eventually should understand that the output target is unobtainable and revise their output target downward. 
Blinder (1998) maintains that central banks actually target the natural rate of output, implying that overly 
expansionary policymakers cannot be the cause of any inflation bias.  
While there may be reasons to believe this critique applies to “enlightened” policymakers in industrial 
countries like the U.S., it seems less likely to apply to developing countries, to which our analysis is most relevant. 
As Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) argue, as long as monetary policymaking is dominated by political authorities 
with short horizons and a strong concern for employment and economic activity, the standard inflation bias story 
seems reasonably realistic.  
12 Obstfeld (1996) assumes u is uniformly distributed; Flood and Marion (1999) show how the results are affected 
by using a normal distribution, with fatter tails than the uniform, implying extreme shocks are more likely to occur. 
The uniform distribution has been frequently used due to its analytical tractability in comparison to the normal 
distribution, a distribution that has more obvious empirical relevance, but requires using numerical simulations.  Our 
assumption of a double exponential distribution may be viewed as a compromise between these two – it permits a 
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The full equilibrium in which  ()
e E π π =  is outlined by Figure  4, which graphs expression (7) as an S-
shaped curve for different values of β , together with a 
o 45  line.  The firmness of the policymaker β  
plays a key role in determining the equilibrium. Greater firmness (greaterβ ) shifts the S-shaped curve 
downward to the right.  For “tough” regimes (i.e. high β ), there is a unique equilibrium, associated with 
low expected inflation.  For “soft” regimes (i.e. lowβ ), we have a unique equilibrium associated with 
high inflation.  For intermediate regimes, we have multiple equilibria, with 2 or 3 possible inflation rates.  
The Figure illustrates the case of 2 equilibria for  0.2 β =  (points A and D) and 3 equilibria for 0.1 β =  
(points A, B, and C). 
In the Appendix we show that forβ  close to  p β  the multiple equilibria can be Pareto ranked by 
the level of expected inflation by proving the following claim 
 
Claim 1:  Expected social loss  () E L rises with expected inflation 
e π . 
Assuming that the multiple equilibria occur with equal probability, it follows that the association between 
the firmness of the regime and expected inflation is discontinuous in the intermediate range of firmness, 
and that the move from the multiple equilibrium range to a unique equilibrium of low inflation is 
associated with a large drop in expected inflation.   
  This discontinuity implies that there are large potential gains from eliminating the multiple 
equilibria and is the key for our analysis. It implies that it is desirable to bias the choice of the monetary 
authority’s firmness towards the conservative end of the available pool, not only in order to mitigate the 
inflation bias arising from time inconsistency, but also to eliminate the excessive expected inflation due to 




firmness level and hence conservative bias.  Such a bias, however, comes also with costs in the form of a 
lesser responsiveness by the authority to shocks.  Hence, there is a trade off between the ex-ante gains 
from stabilizing expectations and the ex-post costs associated with having a conservative decision maker 
who is unwilling to allow the exchange rate to adjust in response to very large shocks.  
 
2.2  Costly Regime Change 
We complete the model by assuming that ex-post the public has the costly option of replacing the 
existing monetary regime with one representing the public’s preferences, i.e. a monetary authority 
characterized by p β β = .
13 We denote the cost of regime change by  rc c and assume
14   













implying the relative cost of regime change exceeds the relative firmness bias of the existing monetary 
authority. It follows that the inflation rate observed with a monetary authority of type β is  
(9) 
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A monetary authority of type β  leaves the exchange rate unchanged for shocks in the range   uuu >>. 
The regime remains in place when u is higher, but not “too” high,  i.e.  rc uu u >> (in which case the 
currency is devalued) or low enough, but not “too” low, i.e.  rc uuu >>  (in which case the currency is 








. For very 
                                                 
13 For simplicity, we assume that the new regime is also characterized by exchange rate target bands and rule out the 
possibility of a purely flexible exchange rate regime with an inflation expectations target.  






large shocks, however, i.e. or rc rc uu u u >> , it is socially optimal to replace the regime as well as 











, which is larger than π  since  p β β > .
15 
  To understand this behavior, we compare the ex post social loss function (2) for the cases of no 
devaluation (
fix L ), devaluation by a policymaker of firmness typeβ  (
dev Lβ ), and a regime change and 
devaluation set by a (new) policymaker of firmness type  p β  (
p
rc Lβ ):  
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, is the sum of three terms: the inflation cost associated with devaluation  (the public cost 
parameter, p β , times the square of the amount of devaluation-induced inflation), the cost induced by 
suboptimal output level, and the direct devaluation cost, c.  Analogously, 
rc Lβ , the social loss function 












(reflecting the public preferences for a greater devaluation, since  p β β > ) is the sum of  these three terms 
evaluated at the higher devaluation rate, plus the extra cost associated with regime change,  rc c .   
Applying (3), the existing monetary authority will not devalue for u shocks in the range 
uuu >>, since
dev fix M M β > .  We can also show for shocks in this range that the public will not prefer a 
regime change because the welfare loss of doing so is less than that of maintaining the regime and leaving 
the exchange rate unchanged, i.e.   
p
rc fix LL β > .  
                                                 
15 The expected depreciation rate that prevails in the event of regime change is the same as under a completely 




To demonstrate this, note from (10) that 
p














or, equivalently, the cost of a devaluation induced by a regime change ( rc c c + ) exceeds the decline of the 















which reduces to  












However, the definitions of  , uu   imply  
2 (1 ) ( ) (1 )
e ck u c β πβ −+<++ <+,    
which combined with (8) implies (11) holds.  Thus, for uuu >>, the incumbent monetary authority 
remains in place and no devaluation occurs, reflecting the “ inflation taming” effect of having a relatively 
tough central bank manager when the cost of regime change is significant.  
Suppose now that u is large enough (in absolute value) to induce the policymaker to adjust the 
exchange rate, but not large enough to prompt a change in regime, e.g.  rc uu u >>.  The resultant rate of 










implying a social welfare loss of  
dev fix LL β < .  In this case the public continues to support the existing  
regime as long as the magnitude of devaluation chosen by the policymaker, given by (12), is not viewed 
as “too timid” a response to the shock and/or if the cost of regime change is not too high, i.e. 
dev rc
p LL β β < .  
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Thus for  rc uu u >>, the shock u is high enough to induce the policymaker to devalue, but not high 
enough to prompt a regime change. While the policymaker devalues at a rate that is below the public’s 
desired rate ( rc π π >  since  p β β > ), the shock is not high enough to induce a regime change.  This is the 
down side of the conservative bias:  the policymaker is too timid in the use of discretionary policy.  Yet, 
for this range of shocks, the social cost of regime change still exceeds the marginal benefit to 
implementing a higher devaluation rate.  Only when  rc uu >  is a regime change and a greater magnitude 
of devaluation desirable.  A similar analysis holds for  rc uuu >>  and   rc uu > . 
Figure 4 illustrates the ex-ante gains associated with conservative bias.  It graphs  ()
e E π π =  and 
illustrates the determination of equilibrium expected inflation, for the case where c = 0.1, k = 0.1, θ = 7, 
0.06, 0.1 rc p c β ==  and the firmness of the monetary authority corresponding to the two S-shaped 
curves, from top to bottom, is 2 . 0 , 1 . 0 = β . It is easy to confirm that condition (8) is satisfied for these 
parameters. 
The top S-shaped curve corresponds to the case where the monetary authority anti-inflation 
firmness equals the public’s anti-inflation preference, i.e.  0.1 p β β = = . The rational expectations 
inflation rate is determined by the intersection of the 45o line and this curve.  The outcome in this case is 
one of multiple equilibria, one of which is a high inflation equilibrium (at point B), with  % 100 =
e π .  
The simulation reveals that the threshold level associated with the switch from multiple equilibria to a 
unique equilibrium case is (about) β = 0.2 (where the S-curve “kisses” the 45o ray from below, as at point 
C).  Note that this switch is associated with a large discontinuous drop in expected inflation.  It can be 
verified that the net effect of switching from a policymaker with firmness level  0.1 p β β == (matching 
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 ; hence  rc uu > , i.e., there is a non-empty range of discretionary devaluations 
by the conservative policymaker. Note also that the gap between the public’s and the monetary authorities’ welfare 
losses in the event of a devaluation not accompanied by a  regime change is proportional to the difference between 
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the public’s desired firmness level) to a policymaker with β = 0.2 is a large drop in expected social loss, 
] [L E .  It is also the case that, as drawn with the S-curve tangent to the 45o ray, choosing the threshold β  
= 0.2 with associated inflation at point A  is optimal: further increases in the conservative bias would 
reduce welfare.   
To understand the determinants of the optimal level of bias, we note that in general, for a given 
public anti-inflation preference level p β , the welfare effect of choosing a more conservative monetary 
authority type can be expressed as 
(14)  [] [] []
e
e








The first term of (14) corresponds to the direct welfare effect of greater conservative bias, holding the 
expected inflation constant.  The second term measures the indirect effect of greater conservative bias 
through changing expected inflation. In the Appendix we also show that  
 
Claim 2: For a given level of  p β , (i)  [] / 0 EL β ∂∂ > , i.e. greater conservative bias increases the expected 
social loss, holding expected inflation given;  (ii) ([ ] / ) ( / ) 0
ee EL ππ β ∂ ∂∂ ∂ < , i.e. greater conservative 
bias reduces the expected social loss by reducing expected inflation. 
 
That the expected loss rises with a more conservative regime follows from the property that in 
circumstances leading to exchange rate adjustment, a more conservative decision maker uses discretion 
more timidly. A more conservative monetary authority has an opposing effect on expected loss by 
reducing expected inflation. Consequently, the welfare effect of the conservative bias is ambiguous, being 
the sum of two opposing effects.  Choosing the candidate with the conservative bias sufficiently high 
enough to eliminate the multiple equilibria would be optimal if the drop in expected inflation (captured by 
the second term) dominates the first.  This will be the case if the discrete drop in expected inflation is 
large enough, as is the situation in Figure 4.  The conservative bias comes, however, with potential ex-
post costs: the policy maker may be “too conservative” when bad shocks hit the economy.  In these 
circumstances, a very bad state of nature would induce a regime change, and a large discretionary 
devaluation.   
  The optimal degree of policy firmness,
* β , corresponds to the point of tangency between the 
lower S-shaped curve and the 45o ray (e.g. point C in Figure 4), and is associated with the relatively low 
expected inflation rate (corresponding to point A ).
17  The location of the  ( )
e E π π =  curves and this 
                                                 
17 The discontinuity of expected inflation associated with this equilibrium implies that the optimal bias must actually 
exceed




equilibrium are perturbed by variations in the costs of devaluation c and of regime change, rc c .  From (7) 
it follows that a higher cost of devaluation, reduces the range where discretionary devaluations take place, 
thereby shifting the expected inflation curves downward.  A similar result applies for higher costs of 
regime change,  rc c .  Consequently, a higher cost of regime change or higher cost associated with 
devaluation each reduce the optimal conservative bias needed to prevent multiple equilibria. That is,   
(15) 
** /0 , /0 ; / 0 , / 0 .
ee
rc rc dd c dd c dd c dd c πβ π β <<< <  
We can express this relation in reduced form as: 
** * * [, ] ; / 0 , / 0 rc rc cc c c ββ β β = ∂∂ < ∂∂ < . 
  We next turn to the effects of the exit from an exchange rate regime on output. The association 
between the duration of the regime and the magnitude of the output drop following a devaluation 
triggered by a regime change is summarized by the following: 
 
Claim 3:  For a pegged exchange rate regime that is maintained until a large enough adverse shock 
induces a regime change and devaluation, the output decline associated with the change is larger the 
longer is the duration of the prior pegged regime. 
 
We prove this claim in several stages.  First, we evaluate the factors determining the output 
decline associated with a shock large enough to lead to regime change.  Next, we characterize the factors 
determining the duration of the peg, and identify the factors impacting both the duration of the peg, and 
the ultimate cost of the exiting the peg.  
Denote by  rc u the adverse productivity shock which is large enough to cause a regime change, i.e. 
rc rc uu >  (see the discussion after (12)).  Applying (12’) and the output equation, the resulting regime 
change is associated with a negative output gap of  
(16)  () () ()
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knife-edge discontinuity in the effect of β on expected inflation, forβ  just below the threshold 
* β  there are 
multiple equilibria for expected inflation, while forβ  marginally above
* β a unique equilibrium with lower expected 
inflation  occurs. This discontinuity also applies to the sign of (14) and the impact of β  on expected welfare:  for 
* ββ >  (




Substituting with the definition of  rc u  from (13’) implies that












 ,  where 
1










It can be verified readily that  /0 rc dd c φ >  and  / 0 dd φ β < , implying that a higher cost of regime 
change ( rc c ), or a lower conservative bias ( p β β − ), increase the output gap at the time of the regime 
change.
19  
Further insight is gained by evaluating the duration of a peg.
20  Denote the probability of 
sustaining the peg in each period by  
(17)  ()
u
u f ud u Γ=∫ , 
where, recall from (2), the upper and lower bounds of productivity shocks inducing a devaluation are 
given by 
   (1 ) ; (1 )
ee uc k u c k β πβ π ≡+ − − ≡ −+ − − . 
The probability of sustaining the peg for exactly j periods is the probability that during the first j periods 
the real shock lies within the no devaluation zone,  u u u < < , and falls outside this zone in period j+1: 
). 1 ( Γ − Γ
j  Consequently, the expected peg duration,  [Peg Duration] E , is the weighted average of 
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21  Hence, the expected duration of a fixed exchange rate equals the 
probability of sustaining the peg, relative to the probability of exiting the peg:   
(18)   [] Peg Duration /(1 ) E =Γ −Γ .  
                                                 
18 Note that the response of output and inflation to productivity shocks is discontinuous around the magnitude of u 
that triggers a regime change.  That is, for  rc uu <   ( ) /(1 ) ( )
e y kk u ββ π − ≤− + + + , while for  rc uu >  the output 
gap is given by (16).   
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20 There are four possible cases for exiting from the current currency peg: (i) devaluation without regime change, (ii) 
revaluation without regime change, (iii) devaluation with regime change, and (iv) revaluation with regime change. 
The following discussion focuses only on the first two cases; analysis of the other cases is analogous.   


















Recall from (15) that a higher cost of regime change has the effect of reducing the expected 
inflation 
e π and the optimal conservative bias
*
p β β −  .  This implies a higher probability of sustaining 
the peg (since the range uu −  widens), as well as higher level of φ  (since  /0 rc dd c φ >  and  
/0 dd φ β < ).
22  Hence, a higher cost of regime change implies, on average, a longer duration of the peg, 
and greater output costs associated with exchange rate change, when a big enough adverse shock occurs.    
 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
Exits from pegged exchange rate regimes typically have been accompanied by output declines. 
Moreover, a simple regression of the magnitude of output growth following exits over the period 1980-
2001 against the duration of pegged exchange rate spells yields a significantly negative coefficient, 
implying that more long-lived regimes result in more costly regime change. 
To explain these stylized facts, we have presented a model in which the conservative bias of an 
exchange rate/monetary regime as well the cost of changing an exchange rate regime affects the tradeoff 
between anti-inflation credibility gains and the ultimate welfare losses costs incurred when exiting the 
peg.  In particular, we have shown that greater conservative bias or higher costs of regime change each 
reduce expected inflation as long as the regime remains in place. However, the output costs are 
correspondingly higher once a sufficiently large adverse shock prompts an exit from the regime.   
This analysis helps understand the explosive ending of many recent pegged exchange rate 
regimes, such as that of Argentina in 2001.  In our framework the legal anchoring of Argentina’s currency 
board regime through the country’s constitution can be interpreted as an effort to raise the cost of 
devaluation and regime change. While this effort provided obvious anti-inflation credibility gains, it also 
raised the eventual costs of exiting the peg.  It apparently prolonged the duration of the peg, but at a cost 
of greater loss of output upon the ultimate exit from the peg via a regime change.   
                                                 
22 The impact of higher devaluation cost c on the duration of the peg is the sum of two opposing forces: (i) a positive 
effect through lower expected inflation and an increase in u , and (ii) a negative effect through a lower optimal 
conservative bias that  reduces u . It can be shown that the first effect dominates, i.e. a higher devaluation cost c 
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A. Claim 1: Expected social welfare loss increases with expected inflation, for  e k π < − : 
Proof:  Equation (4) and the envelope theorem imply that for β  close to p β  
(A1)  
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≅ ∫ ,  
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and   , uu  are defined by (2). Inspection of (A2) reveals that  ) (u y  is a piece-wise linear function; and 
) (u y  is a symmetric function of u around  k e − = π .  Recall that ) (u f is symmetric around  0 = u .  
Hence,  








.   
Note also that 
22 () /[ ] 0
e EL π ∂∂ > . Consequently, the expected loss function is minimized at  k e − = π , 
and for  k e − > π , higher expected inflation increases the expected loss function. 
 
B. Claim 2: (i)  [] / 0 EL β ∂∂ > , (ii) ([ ] / ) ( / )0
ee EL ππβ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ <  
Proof:  Recall the definitions of  ,,
p
fix dev rc LLL β β  in (10) for the social loss in the absence of no 
devaluation, devaluation by a policy maker of type β , and regime change followed by devaluation set by 
a policymaker of type  p β , respectively. The expected social loss is 




u u u u
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Applying the envelope theorem, it follows that increasing the conservative bias affects the expected loss 
function by the sum of two terms, reflecting the direct effect of greater bias and the indirect effect through 




(B2)     [] [] []
e
e







  .   
The first term is given by  
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Hence   [ ]/ 0 EL β ∂∂ > , implying that increasing the conservative bias reduces the actual exchange rate 
adjustment in the range where the policymaker would devalue (or revalue), reducing social welfare.    
In order to sign the second term, the impact of β  on welfare through changing expectations, note 
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.   
Consequently, since higher β reduces expected inflation (i.e.  / 0
e πβ ∂ ∂<),  the lower expected inflation 


















Table 1. Output Growth and Duration of Pegged Regime  
 
  1980-2001  1990-2001 
 
All 
Exits   
Disorderly 
Exits 





Duration   -0.0061** -0.0172***  -0.0108** -0.0158***
  (0.0030) (0.0044)   (0.0041)  (0.0052) 
  [0.044] [0.000]   [0.014]  [0.008] 
constant  0.1465 -0.6770   0.6454  -0.6567 
  (0.8012) (1.1067) (0.9974) (1.4693)
  [0.856] [0.612] [0.523] [0.661]
# of exit obs.  62   32     32   18   
R2   0.0707 0.273  0.174 0.280 
 
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses; p-values in brackets. *** indicates 
significance at 1%, ** at 5%. Dependent variable is minimum of output growth (in percent) in year of exit 




















































































































































































































































































 Figure 4. Expected Inflation and Multiple Equilibria 
 
 
          () E π  
e π  
 
Notes: Plotted curves assume 0.1, 0.06, 0.1, 0.1, 7 pr c cc k β θ = == = = . The top bolded 
curve determines expected inflation for a monetary authority with firmness  p β β =  = 0.1.  
The bottom curve determines expected inflation for an authority with firmness 0.2 β =  that 
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